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TRANSFER OF INTEREST AFTER
PENDENCY – A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE SOLUTIONS
ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN
AND GERMAN CIVIL
PROCEDURE SYSTEMS

MADELEINE TOLANI

I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper deals with the problem of the transfer of interest in the
context of litigation, which occurs with reasonable frequency in
commercial law. The transfer of interest after pendency arises when a
litigant assigns his rights or obligations to a third party while the action is
pending. This is illustrated by the following short example: A – the
owner of some jewelry – brings a suit against B, claiming the restitution
of the jewelry, which he lent to B. During the lawsuit, B sells the jewelry
to C and tells him about the pending lawsuit, and that A had sold the
jewelry to him. However, transfer of interest is not only employed when
an individual litigant transfers an asset; it is also relevant in a corporate
context when a business organization merges or dissolves pendente lite.
As a result, another legal entity is created and, thus, becomes the
successor.1
In this example, the question arises how different legal systems treat the
problem of transfer of interest. The answers vary and give cause for
1. Luxliner v. Luxliner, 13 F.3d 69, 71 (1993); Froning’s Inc. v. Johnston Feed Service, Inc.,
568 F.2d 108, 110; DeVilliers v. Atlas Corp., 360 F.2d. 292, 297.
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shedding more light on the respective rules in a civil law country like
Germany, whose procedures are characterized as “inquisitorial,” and a
common law country, like the U.S., whose procedure is described as
“adversarial.” The procedural rules concerning the transfer of interest
play a considerable role in modern civil procedure and interestingly have
not been subject to any comparative analysis so far. This article will
analyze the different concepts of transfer of interest. It will focus on the
various criteria for substitution and its effects. Furthermore, it will
discuss the central objectives of the rules and differences in the legal
cultures.
II.

DIFFERENT MODELS FOR TRANSFER OF INTEREST

Procedural laws offer a number of possible solutions for the problem of
transfer of interest after pendency. One example is the prohibition of
transfer during the pendency of the action. This was the preferred
solution under Roman law, aiming at the protection of the opposing
party. Some European countries developed their own legal solutions
based on this rule, which vary somewhat. France and the Netherlands, for
instance, did not adopt the Roman rule, while some parts of Germany did
and kept the prohibition until 1879, when the German Code of Civil
Procedure came into force.2 The development of trade and the
subsequent need to have a flexible system in the modern economy may
have been the reasons for this evolution.3 However, this explanation is
considered to be too simple, because trade was already increasing in
Germany between the sixteen and eighteen hundreds.4
In the current German system and in the U.S., the transfer is now
allowed,5 which means that the asset remains marketable despite the
pendency of the litigation. This solution seems reasonable, because it
would be unfair for the owner to lose the right to sell his asset solely
because he is in litigation and has to defend his right, which often
happens involuntarily.
In the above-mentioned example, B could sell the asset and give it to C
even though the litigation is pending against B. The logical consequence
2. Kohler, Funktionales Recht – Zum Wandel im Rechtsdenken, dargestellt an einem
zivilprozessualen Beispiel, in: AcP 192 (1992), at 255, 258 (Ger.).
3. Mandrioli, Direitto Processuale Civile, 3, Torino, 2007 at 406. (It.).
4. See supra note 2. Another interesting fact is the existence of the prohibition of transfer as a
consequence of the pendency of a proceeding in some cantons in Switzerland. However, without any
sanction, the transfer is not void. O. Vogel, Grundriß des Zivilprozessrechts, 5th edition (1997),
chapter 5 mn 107 at 151, i.V.m. chapter 8 mn 54 at 214. (Ger.).
5. The transfer after pendency is also allowed in Italy under Article 111 of the Italian Code of
Civil Procedure (ICCP) and in Japan under Article 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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would be that B is substituted and the real holder of the asset, C, takes
over B`s position. Another option is that the successor would have the
right to intervene. Finally, another possibility is the continuance of the
trial between the original parties, A and B. Under this last solution, the
procedural situation would not be affected by the transfer.
However, there are different rules governing transfer of interest, which
can be found in § 265 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.) 25 (c) in the U.S.
III. FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY AS CRITERA OF THE
ANALYSIS
The primary purpose of institutions of civil justice in modern political
economies is the fair, accurate, and efficient vindication of private rights
and interests.6 Thus, the above-mentioned rules of civil procedure
concerning the transfer of interest will be analyzed according to the
following criteria of fairness and efficiency.
A.

FAIRNESS

A procedural mechanism can be considered fair if it takes care of the
interests of the different parties. The principle of fairness contains the
following different aspects: (1) fair notice and fair warning; (2) a hearing
before an impartial judge; (3) rationality of the proceeding; and (4) fair
play.7 Fairness is a fundamental feature of a proceeding in a State
embodying the rule of law (constitutional State) and is derived from the
constitutions of both Germany and the U.S.
In Germany, the Supreme Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) has been vigilant in applying constitutional
norms to civil litigation. The Court interprets the general clauses of the
Constitution (Grundgesetz), Article 2, which guarantees citizens the
maximum scope of personal freedom consistent with an ordered society,
and Article 3, which guarantees that all persons are equal before the law
(Alle Menschen sind vor dem Gesetz gleich),8 as requiring a “fair
proceeding” in both criminal and civil litigation.

6. For comparison, see Peter L. Murray & Rolf Stürner, German Civil Justice 575 (2004).
7. Simona Grossi, A Comparative Analysis Between Italian Civil Proceedings and American
Civil Proceedings Before Federal Courts, 20 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 213 (2010).
8. See supra note 6, at 5; This has been interpreted to require that the parties have equal
chances (Waffengleichheit) in civil litigation. Musielak, ZPO, 9th edition (2012) introduction, mn
29-30. (Ger.).
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Fair play is also embodied in the Due Process and the Equal Protection
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. These clauses guarantee the fairness of
a proceeding. The Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
governmental actions that would deprive “any person of life, liberty or
property without due process.” One part of the Due Process Clause
restricts the legislature, while the other part has a procedural aspect that
guarantees a certain process if a person is deprived of life, liberty or
property. In Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., the Court held that the
right to a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a right protected by the
Due Process Clause.9
B.

EFFICIENCY

Another term of comparison is efficiency. Efficiency is defined as the
least time and cost consuming.10 “A lengthy and expensive device will
not be efficient and the legal system should try, as much as it can, to
adopt efficient solutions.”11 However, efficiency cannot be isolated from
the principle of fairness; there is a correlation between fairness and
efficiency because a device that is very time and cost consuming cannot
be evaluated as being fair.12 Thus, the reasonable duration of a trial is an
element of a fair proceeding.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RESPECTIVE RULES
THE GERMAN RULES

A.

The German rule § 265 ZPO (Code of Civil Procedure) provides the
following concerning a transfer of a moveable property or right:
(1) Pendency shall not exclude the right of either party to
transfer the property subject to the litigation or to assign the
claim asserted. (2) Such transfer or assignment shall have no
effect on the proceeding. The successor shall not be entitled,
without the consent of the opponent, to enter the proceeding as
the position of his or her predecessor as the party or to intervene.
In the event that the successor joins the proceeding § 69 shall not
be applicable. (3) In the event that the plaintiff made the transfer
or assignment, then to the extent that, pursuant to § 325, the
judgment would not be effective against the successor, the

9.
10.
11.
12.

Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 338 (1982).
See supra note 7.
Id.
Id., “Efficiency and fairness are interrelated concepts.”
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objection may be raised by him or her that he or she is no longer
entitled to assert the claim.13
This basic principle means that after a transfer of interest occurs, the
same proceeding is continued among the original parties. Three
requirements must be fulfilled in order to continue the trial between the
original parties: (1) the transfer is about a property under litigation or
about a claim asserted; (2) the legal succession occurs after pendency;
(3) the transferee does not qualify as a good faith transferee without
notice under § 325 and would be bound by the judgment rendered
between the original parties.
If the court has no knowledge of the transfer, the judgment will be
rendered against or in favor of the transferor based on the substantive law
before the transfer.14 Thus, in the example above, the trial would be
continued between A and B even if A is no longer the owner of the asset
under the substantive law.
If the same proceeding is continued between the original parties, a claim
by the successor will be precluded as a consequence of the pendency of
the suit with the same subject matter, § 261 III number 1 ZPO.15 The
position of the transferor is not limited. He can also accept the claim,
renounce, or even settle.16
The situation is problematic when the court has knowledge of the
transfer. The question arises if the decision should be based on the
situation before the transfer, or if the court should consider the transfer
somehow. One way to read § 265 ZPO (“... shall have no effect on the
proceeding”) would be that the transfer should not affect the court’s
decision at all; it should be irrelevant (“Irrelevanztheorie”). Another
interpretation could be that § 265 ZPO (“... shall have no effect on the
proceeding”) only concerns the formal positions of the parties in the
proceeding, which should remain the same. That would mean that the
transfer is relevant for the decision, because under substantive law, the
proceeding is about someone else’s asset, namely the transferee’s
(“Relevanztheorie”). The divergence of the party in the proceeding and
13. N. Stephan Kinsella & Paul E. Cormeaux, Digest of Commercial Laws of the World,
Binder 7 (Oceana ed. 2000).
14. However, it will usually also be applicable to the transferee under § 325 ZPO and
enforceable under § 727 ZPO. This will be discussed later in this article under sections III. 1. c) cc)
and III. 1. d).
15. Becker-Eberhard, in: Münchener Kommentar Zivilprozessordnung: ZPO, 4th ed. (2013) §
265 mn 69. (Ger.).
16. Foerste, in: Musielak Kommentar ZPO, 9th ed. (2012) § 265 mn. 9. (Ger.).
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the owner of a right under substantive law can be practiced with the
special mechanism “Prozessstandschaft,” which means that someone that
is not the owner of a right is a party at trial.17 One practical consequence
of the “theory of relevance” is the following: if the plaintiff transfers the
subject of the litigation to a third person, the defendant can only raise
such defenses that he has against the successor. Furthermore, the plaintiff
has to change his claim because the defendant has to pay or give the asset
to the transferee.18 This theory is prevailing and accepted by the courts19
in situations of the transfer by the plaintiff, but if the transfer occurs on
the side of the defendant, the transfer will be irrelevant. The plaintiff
cannot change the complaint and ask for the decision to be rendered
against the successor who had never participated in the proceeding. The
court will not consider the transfer in its decision.20
1.

Criteria for the substitution under § 265 II ZPO

Under § 265 II ZPO, the transferor can be substituted when the opposing
party consents. Furthermore, although the law does not state it expressly,
the transferor is also required to consent. This requirement is based on
the unwritten German principle that nobody should be deprived of the
position he has in a proceeding without his own participation.21 Due to
this principle, the consent of the opposing party and of the transferor
cannot be substituted by a court order based the on possible advantages
of the procedure. Therefore, the power to substitute lies in the hands of
the parties.
If the transferor refuses to consent, the successor can intervene in the
form of a principal intervention (“Hauptintervention” § 64 ZPO), § 265
II sentence 2 ZPO. If the opposing party refuses to consent, the successor
cannot participate at the proceeding as a party and also cannot intervene.
He can only support the position of the transferor in the form of the

17. “Prozessstandschaft“ can be based on law (“gesetzliche Prozessstandschaft“), like in the
transfer of interest, or can be based on a contract (“gewillkürte Prozessstandschaft“), for which
special requirements exist.
18. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGH] [NJW] 2004, 2152 (2154) (Ger.); Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch [BGH] NJW 1986, 3206 (3207); Becker-Eberhard, in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO, 4th
ed. (2013) mn 83; Foerste, in: Musielak Kommentar ZPO, 9th ed. (2012) mn. 10 (Ger.); Grunsky,
Die Veräußerung der streitbefangenen Sache (1968) at 101 ff. (Ger.).
19. Since RGZ 56, 301 (Ger.); Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGHZ] 26, 31 (37) (Ger.); NJW-RR
1986, 1182. (Ger.).
20. But the decision can be enforced against the transferee after the title is modified under §
727 ZPO.
21. Becker-Eberhard, in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO, 4th ed. (2012) § 265 mn. 5. (Ger.).
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auxiliary intervention (“Streitgehilfe”) pursuant to § 67 ZPO.22 Some
scholars criticize this restriction as a violation of the constitutional right
to be heard, Article 103 GG.23 Even if an auxiliary intervention should
not be seen as a sufficient tool for the transferee, it would go too far to
qualify it as a violation of the right to be heard.24 In this context, the right
of the transferee to be heard has to be balanced with the protection of the
opposing party. If the opposing party refuses to consent, the transferee’s
right to be heard is overruled.25
Overall, the criteria for a substitution – consent of the parties – are very
clear and foreseeable. Thus, the German concept can be characterized as
fair.
2.

The Rationale Behind § 265 ZPO

The rationale behind the German Rule is to avoid a duplicative trial
about the same subject matter. This can be done either by the transferee
taking over the proceeding or by continuing the proceeding with the
original parties. The Germans have adopted the latter.
There are two main advantages to the German concept. The first one is
an advantage for the opposing party, because he does not need to adjust
to a new person. The Federal Supreme Court (“Bundesgerichtshof”)
emphasizes that the opposing party should not be deprived of the
achievements, for instance the result of evidentiary proceedings that have
been reached so far during the proceeding.26 The second advantage is that
continuing the proceeding between the same parties avoids delays and
interruptions that a substitution of parties causes.27
The first aspect of the protection of the opposing party seems to be fair.
The second aspect of avoiding delays means the proceeding is less time
consuming than the substitution. Therefore, the proceeding is economical
and complies with the basic German principle of civil procedure favoring
concentration of proceedings (“Konzentrationsmaxime”). Thus, the

22. Auxiliary intervention means, that someone intervenes to support the position of a party
whose victory or defeat will legally affect the interest of the intervener. Compare for intervention in
general: Murray & Stürner, German Civil Justice at 206 ff (2004). (Ger.).
23. Pawlowski, Probleme des rechtlichen Gehörs bei der Veräußerung einer Streitsache. - Zur
Auslegung der §§ 265, 325 ZPO, in: JZ 1975 at 681 ff. (682). (Ger.).
24. Becker-Eberhard, in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO, 4th ed. (2013) mn 70. (Ger.).
25. Schwartz, Gewährung und Gewährleistung des rechtlichen Gehörs durch einzelne
Vorschriften der Zivilprozessordnung at 78 (1977). (Ger.).
26. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGH], NJW 1998, 156 following (158). (Ger.).
27. Becker-Eberhard, in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO, 4th ed. (2013) mn 3. (Ger.).
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Federal Supreme Court concludes that the proceeding should be shielded
by § 265 II ZPO from changes under substantive law.28
3.

The Binding Effect of the Judgment and its Limitations

This next section discusses the binding effect of the judgment and its
limitations, as it is important to the comprehensiveness of this paper.
(a)

The Rationale of the Inter-partes-doctrine

The general rule is that the judgment entered, adverse or favorable, is
only applicable inter partes. Rule § 325 I ZPO defines the subjective
scope of the res judicata effect of a judgment (and has to be read jointly
with § 265 ZPO).
The inter-partes-doctrine is based on two fundamental principles: Firstly,
the principle that the litigation is under the control of the parties
(dispositive principle, Dispositionsmaxime). This principle finds support
in Article 2 of the Constitution, which guarantees citizens the maximum
scope of personal freedom consistent with an ordered society.29 It is a
fundamental principle that the control of the initiation, termination, and
scope of a civil law suit lies in the hands of the parties.30 Secondly, the
doctrine is based on the principle of party control of facts and the means
of proof (Verhandlungsmaxime).31 Only the parties may participate in the
litigation, whereas non-parties do not have influence and thus, usually
cannot be bound by a judgment.32
(b) The Extension of the Res Judicata to Nonparties
A judgment in successor in interest cases is an exception to the interpartes-principle. The judgment can have effect upon the successor in
interest with respect to the subject matter of the claims actually asserted
and decided.33 This is the necessary consequence under § 325 I ZPO,
which defines the subjective scopes of the res judicata as the following:
(1) The final judgment shall be effective for and against the
parties and the persons who became legal successors of the
28. BGH WM 1992, 1451, 1452. (Ger.).
29. Murray & Stürner, German Civil Justice 575 at 154 (2004).
30. Id. at 155.
31. Each party bears the responsibility to describe to the court the factual proof for each
contested factual allegation and to identify the source of that proof. Compare Kinsella & Cormeaux,
Digest of Commercial Laws of the World, Binder 7 at 158.
32. Gottwald, in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO, 4th ed. (2013) § 325 mn. 1. (Ger.).
33. See supra note 6, at 357, 359.
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parties after the occurrence of pendency of the action or acquired
possession of property involved in the litigation in such a manner
that one of the parties or his or her legal successor became the
indirect possessor. (2) The provisions of the civil law for the
benefit of those who derive rights from an unauthorized person
shall be applicable analogously.34
Without this binding effect upon the successor, the continuance of the
trial against the original party would be unacceptable for the adverse
party. The extension of the res judicata to a successor pendente lite is
characterized as a “natural and necessary supplement” to § 265 ZPO.35
(c)

Limitation of the Binding Effect to Third Persons

The judgment is not binding on the third person – the successor – if he
has good faith. The good faith refers to the pendency of the trial and to
the entitlement of the transferor to transfer the asset under substantive
law (“double bona fide”), § 325 II ZPO. In the situation of good faith, the
transferor is not entitled to continue the litigation. Section 265 (3)
provides,
in the event that the plaintiff made the transfer or assignment,
then to the extent that, pursuant to § 325, the judgment would not
be effective against the successor, the objection may be raised by
him or her that he or she is no longer entitled to assert the
claim.36
However, such an exception to the basic principle of the continuance of
the litigation between the original parties does not exist in the example
described in the introduction, because A has good faith concerning the
ownership of B, but does not have good faith concerning the pendency of
the trial.
4.

Enforceability of the Judgment Against the Transferee

Another question is how a judgment rendered between the original
parties can be enforced later against the transferee. According to rule §
727 ZPO, a modification of the name in the title is the applicable
mechanism if the change of substantive law had not been introduced in
34. See supra note 13.
35. Karl August Bettermann, Die Vollstreckung des Zivilurteils in den Grenzen seiner
Rechtskraft (1948) at 67 (Ger.); Arwed Blomeyer, Zivilprozessrecht: Erkenntnisverfahren, 2nd ed.
(1985) § 92 III 1 a, at 513. (Ger.).
36. See supra note 13.
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the trial. The rule orders, “an enforceable copy may be granted to the
legal successor of the creditor named in the judgment as well as against
the legal successor of the debtor named in the judgment....”37
5.

Application of § 265 ZPO

Section 265 ZPO is applicable for rights and moveable property. The
transfer of immobiles is governed by a special rule: § 266 ZPO.
One problem is the distinction between the transfer of interest and
special rules applicable to the change of a party. The following rules aim
at other post filing events: the death of a party (§ 239 ZPO); the event of
insolvency proceedings with respect to the assets of one party (§ 240
ZPO); or the situation when one party loses his or her capacity to
conduct litigation or when a statutory representative of a party dies (§
241 ZPO). The distinction between those rules located in the first book,
third chapter, and fifth title of the code of civil procedure (Interruptions
and Stay of Proceedings) and rule § 265 located in the second book, first
chapter, first title (Procedure Until the Judgment), can be summarized as
the following: § 265 ZPO is only applicable if the original party is still
viable and if the judgment is binding upon the new owner of the asset.38
If there is doubt, the fundamental criteria for the distinction between
those special rules and the transfer of interest is the protection of the
opposing party. If the opposing party needs to be protected, rule § 265
ZPO will always apply. If it is only necessary to avoid a redundant
second trial, the aforementioned special rule will have to be applied.39
An important note in the modern era is that a merger – a fusion of two
companies without any liquidation – is not considered a transfer of
interest under German law. This is different from the American broad
understanding of transfer of interest, where transfer of interest in a
corporate context occurs when one corporation becomes another by
merger.40 Unlike American law, the transferred company under German
law is treated like the death of a party and the special rules concerning a
37. Section 727 ZPO: (1) “An enforceable copy may be granted to the legal successor of the
creditor named in the judgment as well as against the legal successor of the debtor named in the
judgment, and the possessor of the property involved in the dispute, against whom the judgment is
effective pursuant to § 325, to the extent that the successor or possessor relations is manifest to the
court or is proved by public or notarized form. (2) In the event that the legal succession or the
possessory relation is manifest to the court, such shall be shown in the execution order.” Kinsella &
Cormeaux, Digest of Commercial Laws of the World, Binder 7.
38. Schumann, in: Stein/Jonas, Kommentar ZPO, 21st ed. (1996), § 265 mn 19. (Ger.).
39. Becker-Eberhard, in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO, 4th ed. (2013) § 265 mn 7. (Ger.).
40. Luxliner P.L. Export, Co. v. RDI/Luxliner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69, 72 (1993); Froning`s, Inc. v.
Johnston Feed Service, Inc., 568 F.2d 108, 110 (1978).
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change of party are applicable.41 Consequently, the proceeding will be
suspended until the acceptance thereof by the successors (§ 239 ZPO).42
B.

THE AMERICAN RULES UNDER FEDERAL LAW

One of the consequences of the dual-sovereignty system in the United
States is that in every state there are two separate court systems: the
federal and the state courts. The U.S. civil procedure system is divided
into a federal court system and a state court system. As a consequence of
this separation, there are federal and state rules of civil procedure. This
article analyzes the transfer of interest under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (F.R.C.P.).
F.R.C.P. Rule 25 (c) provides, “In the case of a transfer of interest, the
action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court
upon motions directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original party.” Rule 25 not
only governs the transfer of interest, but also the post filing for events
like (a) death, (b) incapacity of a party, and (d) the substitution of a
public officer that died, resigned or otherwise ceased to hold the office.
Thus, Rule 25 with its broad title “Substitution” is more complex
systematically than its German counterpart, which has separate rules for
the transfer of interest (§ 265 ZPO) and other post filing events (§ 239
ZPO and the following rules).
The continuance between the original parties under Rule 25 (c) is the
obvious similarity to the German law. The absence of substitution does
not have any consequence; the pending action will be continued. Going
back to the example in the introduction, the action would be continued
between A and B. Nothing has to be done after an interest has been
transferred. This is the most significant feature of Rule 25 (c).43 If the
transferor stays in the litigation, without having an interest in the subject
matter litigated, he is called a “nominal party.”
The exception from the continuance between the original parties is based
on an order from the court, which – not sua sponte, but on motion of one
party – can order the transferee to be substituted. Therefore, the decision

41. Becker-Eberhard, in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO, 4th ed. (2013) § 265 mn 44. (Ger.).
42. In contrast, the sale of a business pursuant to Rule 25 HGB (German Commercial Code) §
265 ZPO is applicable with the consequence that the original owner remains as the party if a trial is
pending. Becker-Eberhard, in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO, 4th edition (2013) mn 43.
43. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 743 (1985).
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regarding substitution is ultimately left to the court, which has the
discretion to allow or refuse substitution. The rule is wholly permissive.44
1.

Objective of Rule 25 (c)

The central objective of Rule 25 (c) is – corresponding to the other
portions of Rule 25 – to allow the continued and efficient resolution of
an existing action despite post-filing events.45 The purpose of the rule is
to allow the action to continue unabated when a transfer of interest
occurs, rather than requiring the initiation of an entirely new lawsuit.46
Case law has held that Rule 25 (c) is a valid procedural rule that is
necessary for the efficient functioning of the federal courts.47 Like Rule
25 (a), Rule 25 (c) permits the court to continue to hear a case where the
action survives, but the original party has transferred interest in the
litigation to another. “Rather than require the assignee to initiate a new
action, the rule enables the court to continue the action with the assignee
joined with or in the place of the original party.”48 An initiation of a new
action would be a needless repetition of effort and expense, which is
prevented by the Rule.49 Therefore, the rationale behind the Rule is
efficiency and should be kept in mind while finding the criteria for
substitution or joinder.
2.

Criteria for Substitution: The Court’s Discretion

The discretion that Rule 25 gives the court to order substitution or not,
raises the question for the criteria of substitution. Substitution under the
Rule is not mandatory. Considering the rationale of the Rule – unabated
continuance of the pending trial to avoid starting a new action on the
same issue – it would be more logical to allow substitution only rarely.50

44. Edward I. Niles, Federal Civil Procedure, § 8.440 (2d ed. 1984).
45. Shaun P. Martin, Substitution, 73 Tenn. L. Rev. 545 (2006).
46. ELCA Enterprises, Inc. v. Sisco Equip. Rental & Sales, Inc., 53 F.3d 186, 191 (1995);
General Battery Corp. v. Globe-Union, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 258, 261 (1982).
47. General Battery Corp., 100 F.R.D. at 262.
48. Id. at 262-63.
49. Id. (comparing Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a) and 25(c)).
50. In contrast, commentary literature concerning the Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 368.5 says that in
most cases substitution is “so obviously desirable that it should be ordered as a matter of right if
requested by the transferor or the transferee.” Furthermore, in the event of the transfer of interest
during the continuation of the litigation, “it follows that a substitution of parties should be made.”
Witkin, California Procedure, 5th ed., Volume 4 (2008) § 264, 341. Section 368.5 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure says the following: “An action or proceeding does not abate by the transfer
of interest in the action or proceeding or by any other transfer of an interest. The action or
proceeding my be continued in the name of the original party, or the court may allow the person to
whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the action or proceeding.” The language “may allow”
suggests a discretion, which makes the rule very similar to F.R.C.P. 25(c). Witkin, California
Procedure, 5th ed. Volume 4 (2008) § 264, 339.
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Case law indicates that Rule 25 (c) does not state what factors should
guide the court in determining whether to allow the original party to
continue, or to order the substitution or joinder of the transferee.51
Although the criteria are not mentioned expressly in Rule 25 (c), the
provision is viewed as an unproblematic rule and thus, has not attracted
academic interest so far.52
Likewise, the Rule has not been the subject of a substantial discussion by
courts or commentators.53 In Luxliner P.L. Export, Co. v. RDI/Luxliner,
Inc., the 3rd Circuit held that “Rule 25 (c) does not specify a method for
deciding or a standard to use in determining whether motions can be
decided on the papers. This gap in Rule 25 (c) most likely stems from the
fact that the rule does not easily lend itself to contested motions
practice.”54 Therefore, Rule 25 (c) is only applicable where an interest is
changing hands during the trial. If the interest were transferred prior to
the commencement of the suit, Rule 17 (a) would control.55
(a)

Criteria According to Which Courts Exercise Their Discretions
Under F. R.C.P. 25 (c)

Rule 25 (c) requires a motion for substitution to be made and served with
certain formalities. This requirement was expressly stated by the court in
Froning’s Inc. v. Johnston Feed Service, Inc., in which one corporation
was dissolved and the opponent did not move pursuant to Rule 25 (c).
The United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit held that in
absence of the motion, it is no error to continue the action in the name of
the original parties.56 The service of the motion should be made as
provided under Rule 25 (a), but there is no limit for making the motion.
According to Rule 25 (a), the motion to substitute must be served as
provided in Rule 5 or for a nonparty in Rule 4.
The substitution is entirely a question of convenience. This is
comparable to Rule 15 (d), concerning the supplement of the complaint.
On one hand, the court may find it more convenient to allow the original
party to continue the action alone and that the transferee is not
participating as a party. On the other hand, the court may order the
transferee substituted instead of the original party or the court may order
51. General Battery Corp., 100 F.R.D. at 261.
52. Compare Martin, Substitution, 73 Tenn. L. Rev. 545 (2006).
53. General Battery Corp., 100 F.R.D. at 261.
54. Luxliner P.L. Export, Co., 13 F. 3d at 69.
55. Myrtle E. Hildebrands and Guam Maintenance Inc. v. Far East Trading Company, Inc.,
509 F.2d 1321, 1323 (1975).
56. Froning`s, Inc., 568 F.2d at 108.
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that the transferee be joined as an additional party to the action.57 The
motion for substitution will be granted if the court believes the
transferee’s presence would facilitate the conduct of the litigation.58 It
can even be granted on the condition that there be no delay to trial.59
However, it will be denied if the replacement of the original party by
successor would raise new issues, would require new and further
discovery, and postpone the pending trial.60 These are identical criteria to
the criteria of Rule 15 (d).61 According to the court, there was no abuse of
discretion in denying a motion for substitution when the participation
would be highly disruptive to the administration of the litigation.62
Another guiding factor in favor of joinder should be the question whether
the efforts of the court and the parties up until the present time would be
for naught.63 The described considerations seem to meet the previously
explained requirement of efficiency.
In the unusual circumstance that the proposed successor’s interest would
be in conflict with those of the transferor, the transferor should be
allowed to prosecute the right in his or her own name. The transferor
should not be substituted, but could be joined. This was decided for the
special situation where the same insurer who already had paid the
compensation to the plaintiff represented the plaintiff and also the
defendant.64
The obvious limitation of the court’s discretion is the refusal of
substitution and a refusal of continuance. This complete refusal
essentially punishes the party that moved under Rule 25 (c) and is an
abuse of the court’s discretion.65 In ELCA Enterprises, Inc. v. Sisco
Equipment Rental & Sales, Inc., the district court denied plaintiff’s Rule
25 (c) motion for substitution and also did not allow the plaintiff to
continue. However, the court granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 (c). In this case, the question of
Rule 25 (c) arose because, during litigation, plaintiff ELCA transferred
57. Daniel R. Coquillette, et al., Moore`s Federal Practice, Vol. 3B, 25.08 (2nd ed. 1955).
58. Luxliner P.L. Export, Co., 13 F. 3d at 69.
59. Fontana v. United Bonding Insurance Company v. Rockwood Insurance Company, 468
F.2d 168, 169 (1972).
60. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 738.
61. Id. at 743.
62. National Indep. Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 748 F.2d 602
(1984/1985).
63. General Battery Corp., 100 F.R.D. at 263.
64. Myrtle E. Hildebrands and Guam Maintenance Inc., 509 F.2d at 1323.
65. Elca Enterprises, Inc., 53 F.3d at 191.
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all of its interest to another company, ELCA Properties. The District
Court based its decision on an analysis of the original plaintiff’s claims
against the defendant and held that a “viable action was a necessary
precursor to a substitution of parties,”66 which, according to the court’s
opinion, did not exist in this case. Thus, the District Court determined
that Rule 25 (c) only applies if the original plaintiff retains a cause of
action against the defendant after the transfer of interest. This would be a
question of substantive law.
In a decision of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, it was decided
that Rule 25 (c) does not substantively determine what actions
survive the transfer of an interest; rather, it provides substitution
procedures for an action that does survive. The rule expressly
permits parties to continue in an action, even if they do not
remain the real party in interest, as long as the cause of action
itself survives the transfer to the new party.67
In that case, the defendant argued granting the substitution would permit
ELCA to mount a new case; the court held that “the nature of the action
remains the same regardless of the plaintiff`s name.” The transferee, as
the new owner, would seek the same relief and assumes an identical
position to the transferor in the lawsuit.68 On the other hand, the case
Covington Grain Co., Inc. v. Deal concerns a different situation: the
initial party had a tort claim, whereas the proposed substituted party had
contract-related claims. Here, the District Court’s refusal to allow
substitution was not an abuse of discretion.69
Considering both cases, ELCA Enterprises, Inc. v. Sisco Equipment
Rental & Sales, Inc. and Covington Grain Co., Inc. v. Deal, the unwritten
restrictive requirement of Rule 25 (c) can be stated as: substitution can
only be permitted if the action survived and its nature remains the same.
The positions of the transferor and of the transferee have to be identical.70
The United States District Court in Delaware also considered that the
transferee, who would continue a counterclaim in his position as a
defendant, would not be asserting new claims against the opponent.
Furthermore, the court considered that the opponent will not be
prejudiced in any way by the proposed joinder of the transferee to the

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 188.
Id. at 191.
Id.
Covington Grain Co., Inc. v. Deal, 638 F.2d 1357, 1361 (1981).
General Battery Corp., 100 F.R.D. at 263.
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proceeding and that the transferee would occupy the same relative
position in the continued action as the transferor.71
Applying this criteria, abuse of Rule 25 (c) will be avoided. It is in the
interest of the opposing party that he is not confronted with another
action after the substitution during the litigation. This meets the
requirements of fairness with respect to the opposing party, but secures
the efficiency of the trial as well, because a change of the nature of the
action could make new evidence necessary and thus, would consume
more time and costs.
However, fairness shall not only be secured with respect to the adverse
party. The question of fairness should especially be considered with
respect to the party seeking to be substituted. Under Rule 25 (c), any
party can move for substitution. In the situation that the opposing party
or the original party wishes that a third person may get involved in the
trial, the question arises how it could be fair that this third person
becomes a party.
(b)

Transfer of Interest According to the State Rules

To understand the position of the American law and to find criteria and a
concept for the transfer of interest after pendency, one must consider
state court decisions as well as federal. Transfer of interest usually arises
by a contract situation, which is state law. Federal courts have “limited”
jurisdiction, which means they can only decide certain types of cases
(“enumerated powers”). They are concerned with cases arising under
federal law. If federal law is not involved, federal courts have
jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) under the following
circumstances: when the case involves diversity of citizenship (citizens
of different states or citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a
foreign state), or if the jurisdictional amount exceeds $75,000 exclusive
of interests and costs (diversity jurisdiction). Since contract law is state
law, a federal court in a situation of a transfer of interest can only have
jurisdiction under Rule 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a).
Another reason for considering state cases in this analysis is that Rule 25
(c) is a combination and an adaption of N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) § 8372 and

71. Id. at 263-64.
72. New York Civil Practice Act, formerly Code Civ. Pro. § 756. Section 756 provided that, in
case of any transfer of interest, other than by death, marriage, or other disability of a party, “the
action shall be continued in the name of the original party; or the court may allow the person to
whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the action.”
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Cal. Civ. Proc. Code (1937) § 368.5.73 The text of Section 368.5 of the
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, which the mentioned judgment is based on,74 is
very similar to Rule 25 (c). Section 368.5 of the Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
provides, “The action or proceeding may be continued in the name of the
original party, or the court may allow the person to whom the transfer is
made to be substituted in the action or proceeding.” The language “may
allow” suggests the court may use discretion.75 The text of N.Y.C.P.A.
§ 83 is also very similar to F.R.C.P. 25 (c). This rule provides, “Upon
any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the
original parties unless the court directs the person to whom the interest is
transferred to be substituted or joined to the action.”
Due to this obvious similarity, the interpretation and the criteria of Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 368.5 and N.Y.C.P.A. § 83 cannot differ essentially
from F.R.C.P. 25 (c). Also, it should be noted that due process addresses
both the Federal (5th Amendment) and the States (14th Amendment),
and so the requirements should be identical for each.
In Higgins v. Kay, the Supreme Court of California decided that “in any
proceeding of judicial character, one whose rights or interests may be
affected by action against him therein is entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard,76 and that a failure to accord him that right
amounts to lack of due process of law.”77 In this case, due to the
defendant’s motion for substitution under Code Civ. Proc. § 368.5, the
plaintiff was substituted without any notice to the party sought to be
substituted. The Supreme Court of California held that the order of
substitution without notice of the proposed party was void.78 In the
decision Tuffree v. Stearns Ranchos Co., it was indicated that the court
has discretion to order substitution against the wishes of the transferee.79

73. Werner R. Ilsen & Charles E. Clark, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25 Note to
Subdivisions (b) and (c) (1944 rev. ed.).
74. The applicable rule now concerning transfer of interest is Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 368.5:
“An action or proceeding does not abate by the transfer of an interest in the action or proceeding or
by any other transfer of interest. The action or proceeding may be continued in the name of the
original party, or the court my allow the person to whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the
action or proceeding.”
75. Witkin, California Procedure, Volume 4 § 264, 339 (5th ed. 2008).
76. This concept is an expression of the due process clause. See Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (emphasis added).
77. Higgins v. Kay, 168 Cal. 468, 471-72 (1914).
78. Id. 471, 473.
79. Tuffree v. Stearns Ranchos Co., 124 C. 306 (1899); B. E. Witkin, California Procedure,
Volume 4, § 262, 339 (5th ed. 2008).
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In the case of White v. Hardy,80 which construed N.Y.C.P.A. § 83, the
Supreme Court in New York County stated that where the assignment is
absolute, leaving no interest in the transferor, a motion for substitution
should be granted. However, when the assignment is not absolute – or
where the transferor, notwithstanding the transfer, still has some interest
in the cause of action – the motion for substitution should be denied,
especially when the transferee opposes the motion.81
According to C.C.P. § 756, the case was decided where the defendant
applied for a substitution, but the original plaintiff and the person sought
to be substituted or joined as a plaintiff opposed.82 The court held that “it
is difficult to see how any one can be compelled, against his will, to
become a plaintiff and assume the aggressiveness implied thereby.”83 The
court concluded that the discretion of granting the motion should not be
exercised in this case.
Based on these state decisions, the following rule is derived therefrom:
the right to be heard is constitutional and is a basic aspect of the duty of
government to follow a fair process. Thus, the requirement of notice and
an opportunity to be heard is an expression of the Due Process Clause.84
In the case of transfer of interest during the pendency, a hearing of the
proposed party secures fair play, if the adverse party moves for a
substitution. In other words, the opposing party is not entitled to obtain
substitution without a notice to the transferee, but upon notice, the trial
judge could order it.85 A notice and a hearing of the party that sought to
be substituted would be a less strict requirement in comparison to the
German law, which requires an agreement of all parties and thus, secures
fairness with respect to all of them. On the other hand, the agreement of
all means less flexibility and could prevent substitution in cases where a
change of parties would facilitate the proceeding.
3.

The Binding Effect of the Judgment and its Limitation

In addition to the question of whether it is fair that the successor get
involved in a proceeding of two other parties upon a motion by the
adverse party, a second question of fairness is whether a third person can
be bound by a judgment rendered between two other persons. One could
80. White v. Hardy, 180 Misc. 63, 39 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. 1943) aff’d, 266 A.D. 660, 41
N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 1943).
81. Id.
82. Rothbarth v. Herzfeld, 159 A.D. 732, 144 N.Y.S. 974 (1913).
83. Id. at 735.
84. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
85. Higgins, 168 C. at 472 (1914); B. E. Witkin, California Procedure, Volume 4 § 262, 340
(5th ed. 2008).
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ask if it is possible and fair to bind a person who has not made an
appearance in court. Interestingly, commentators on the Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 368.5 recommend that the opposing party should compel
substitution of the transferee before the judgment. Otherwise, the
transferee may claim that he is not bound by any adverse judgment.86 The
question arises if and under what circumstances the transferee would be
bound.
It is important that the F.R.C.P. do not contain any rules concerning the
res judicata to parties and third persons. Rule 24, for instance, does not
regulate the consequence of an intervention. Another example is F.R.C.P.
13 (a) under which the defendant can raise a counterclaim. The
consequence of losing this right by not using the counterclaim is not
mentioned in the rule. Therefore, the F.R.C.P. are not designed to solve
every single procedural problem in detail; they only provide a
framework. The principles of res judicata were developed by
jurisprudence and are part of case law. “Res judicata (is) ... a doctrine
judicial in origin.”87
(a)

The Rationale of the Inter-partes-doctrine

Similar to the German law, the reason for limiting the binding effect to
the parties is so that only the parties had an opportunity to litigate.88
Other more concrete explanations derive from the right to be heard under
the Due Process Clause. “A person cannot be bound by any judgment
unless he had reasonable notice of the claim against him and opportunity
to be heard in opposition to that claim.”89
In American literature, there are two categories of the right to be heard:
“instrumental” and “formal” on one hand, and “intrinsic” and
“nonformal” on the other hand.90 Under the “instrumental”/“formal”
aspect, the principle of the right to be heard serves to enforce the
substantive law. A person has to be heard in order to present his
arguments and to influence the decision.91 The U.S. Supreme Court held
that “when a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense,
and when the State must listen to what he has to say, substantially unfair
and simply mistaken deprivations of property can be prevented.”92 Under
86. Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 2G(2)(b).
87. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1933).
88. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 34 cmt. a (1982).
89. Coquillette, et al., Moore`s Federal Practice at 0.411 (2nd ed. 1955).
90. Ranier Krause, Urteilswirkungen gegenüber Dritten im
Zivilprozessrecht at 58 (1994). (Ger.).
91. Id.
92. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81.
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the “intrinsic”/“nonformal” component of the due process doctrine, the
participation gives the party the feeling of dignity. In this context,
scholars emphasize the “dignity values.”93
However, on one hand, the aspect of fairness to absent people (Due
Process Clause) has to be considered. On the other hand, the advantages
of a single adjudication and efficiency have to be considered as well. The
judge has to balance both interests, comparable to the situation of class
actions under F.R.C.P. 23, where due process considerations require a
balance between fairness to absent people – whose claims may be
extinguished by the action – and efficiency of a single adjudication.
(b)

The Extension of the Res Judicata to Nonparties

Similar to the German law, the judgment rendered in a situation of a
transfer of interest is not only binding upon the original parties, it is also
effective against the successor, even though he was not substituted or
joined and therefore, is not named in the judgment.94 At first sight and
with regard to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, the binding
effect upon a third person that was not involved in the trial and was not
able to defend himself seems problematic. However, the binding effect
concerning the third person is necessary for the procedural mechanism. If
the judgment would not bind the transferee, it would be useless and
unacceptable for the opposing party95 to continue the litigation. An
interruption would be necessary and a new trial against the third person
would need to be initiated.
Based on the legitimate objective of efficiency, Rule 25 (c) wants to
avoid this second trial against the third party. The binding effect to the
transferee accomplishes the goal of avoiding multiplicity of suits
whenever practicable, thereby saving considerable judicial resources.
This objective finds expression in other mechanisms of the F.R.C.P. as
well. For instance, in the permission for the joinder of several causes of
actions arising out of the same transaction under F.R.C.P. 18,96 the
impleader of a third party defendant under F.R.C.P. 14 (a), the

93. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One’s Rights, 6 Duke L.J. 1153, 1173 (1973).
94. Niles, Federal Civil Procedure, § 8.440; Coquillette, et al., Moore`s Federal Practice,
Volume 3 B, 25.08 (2nd ed. 1955); Fronings’s Inc., 568 F.2d at 110; Luxliner P.L. Export, Co., 13 F.
3d at 71.
95. Compare the foundation of the German Rule.
96. Harris v. Avery, 5 Kann. 146 (1869).
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interpleader under F.R.C.P. 22, or the possibility of counterclaims under
F.R.C.P. 13 (a),97 accomplishes the goal of judicial efficiency.
Concerning the question of whether the binding effect is fair and thus
constitutional, it should be considered that – provided he knew about the
pendency of the trial – the successor could have moved for joinder or
substitution. This would have offered him the chance of an active
participation in the litigation. The court would have been obligated to
consider the successor’s position within the decision about the
substitution or joinder. In contrast, if the third person is not taking the
chance to be part of the trial, he cannot argue that the binding effect upon
him would be unfair. By providing the right to make a motion also for
the successor, Rule 25 (c) consists of a balance between the doctrines of
efficiency and fairness. Thus, concerning a transferee who takes notice of
the pending litigation, the rule is settled that the transferee is bound by
the judgment.98 “In these circumstances it seems reasonable to bind the
transferee on notions of both apparent and actual representational
authority. If the transferee does not wish to be represented by the
transferor, it is a simple matter to seek a substitution of parties.”99
(c)

Explanation For the Binding Effect on Third Parties

The American concept of the binding effect on third persons is different
than the German concept. The basic principle that explains the binding
effect on non-parties in American law is “representation.” Res judicata is
extended to non-parties “when, in certain limited circumstances, a
person, although not a party, has his interest adequately represented by
someone with the same interest who is a party.”100 Representation is
equated with participation at trial by the third person that is represented.
In the context of class actions under F.R.C.P. 23, absent parties are only
bound if they are adequately represented by the representative. This is
important to safeguard the due process rights of class members.101 As a
consequence, a party who did not “literally” have its day in court is not
bound unless it had a “figurative day” in court.102

97. United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077 (1970).
98. 18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4462, 670 (2002).
99. Id. at 670-71.
100. Martin v. Wilks, 480 U.S. 755, Fn. 2 (1989).
101. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
102. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure 670 (9th ed. 2008).
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Limitation of the Binding Effect to Third Persons

The question arises whether the binding effect is limited where the
transferee has no knowledge of the litigation. Generally, it can be stated
that U.S. law is reluctant to protect the bona fide interest of the
purchaser.103 Due diligence is essentially important in any purchase or
transaction.
The case, Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, involved a transferee with
notice. The court held that “persons acquiring an interest in property that
is a subject of litigation are bound by, or entitled to the benefit of, a
subsequent judgment, despite a lack of knowledge.”104 Contrary to this
broad statement that would even bind the bona fide transferee, one could
argue that he needs to be protected. In the circumstance that the
transferee does not know about the pendency of a trial concerning the
interest, he cannot take the chance to get involved in the trial by seeking
substitution or intervening in order to present his position.
Commentators consider the doctrine of fairness and state that the
knowledge of the adversary should control. If the opposing party does
not learn of the transfer before the judgment, the transferee should be
bound. On the other hand, if the adversary knows of the transfer and
knows that the transferee does not know of the pendency, it is argued that
it seems more fair to deny the binding effect. In this case, the opposing
party “could not rely on any apparent authority of the transferor to
represent the ignorant transferee, and can protect his own interest in
repose by giving notice of the litigation to the transferee.”105
4.

Enforceability of the Judgment Against the Transferee

Another question is how the judgment rendered to the original party can
be effective to the transferee that is not mentioned in the title. As
mentioned before, commentators on the Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 368.5
recommend that the opposing party compel substitution. Besides the
possibility of a claim by the transferee that he is not bound, the authors
mention that the opposing party would run the risk that the judgment
may not be enforceable against the transferee.106

103. Zweigert, Rechtsvergleichend-Kritisches zum gutgläubigen Mobiliarerwerb, in: RabelsZ
23 1 ff. (1958) (5-10). (Ger.).
104. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
105. See supra note 98, at 672-73.
106. Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 2G(2)(b).
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However, F.R.C.P. 71 extends the enforcement rules to non-parties. This
rule is very simple. It states, “When an order grants relief for a nonparty
or may be enforced against a nonparty, the procedure for enforcing the
order is the same as for a party.” The cases Westlake North Property
Owners Ass’n v. Thousand Oaks and Berger v. Heckler held, “it seems
clear that Rule 71 was intended to assure that process be made available
to enforce court orders in favor of and against persons who are properly
affected by them, even if they are not parties to the action.”107 Therefore,
it has to be distinguished between the enforcement in favor of a nonparty on the one hand and enforcement against a non-party on the other
hand.
A court order may be enforced by a non-party when that person shares an
identity of interest with a prevailing party or is an intended beneficiary of
the court order with the right to enforce it.108 In the case Peterson v.
Highland Music, Inc., it was decided that an assignee of a party who
prevailed in a dispute concerning the title of property under Rule 71
would be entitled to enforce a judgment in the same manner than the
assignor.109 That means for the situation of the transfer of interest after
pendency, a transferee as a non-party may enforce a judgment rendered
in his favor.
A court order can be enforced against a person who is not a party if that
person’s interests are so closely related to a losing party’s interests that
enforcement against that non-party is not unfair.110 In the context of
enforcing a judgment against a non-party, the F.R.C.P. are restricted to
circumstances where the enforcement does not violate due process or is
otherwise lawful.111
Considering due process, the requirement that has to be met is that the
non-party has notice of the judgments and its contents.112 Furthermore,
the enforcement of a judgment against a person who is a successor in
interest to a party requires that the court obtain personal jurisdiction over
the successor.113 As previously discussed, the transferee can be bound by
the judgment in certain circumstances and thus, the judgment would also
be enforceable against him.
107. Westlake N. Prop. Owners Ass’n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir.
1990); 771 F.2d, 1156, 1165; Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556 (2d Cir. 1985).
108. Federal Practice & Procedure – Civil Rules: 2010 Quick Reference Guide, Vol. 12B, at
1047 (2010).
109. Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1998).
110. Id.
111. See supra note 108.
112. Peterson, 140 F.3d at 1323-24.
113. LiButti v. US, 178 F.3d 114 (2nd Cir. 1999).
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V.

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XIX
DIFFERENCES OF THE CONCEPTS OF TRANSFER OF
INTEREST WITH RESPECT TO DIFFERENT LEGAL
CULTURES

More abstract from the previous discussion, this section examines
whether differences in the legal cultures have an impact on the particular
problem of transfer of interest after pendency under German and
American law. Differences in culture have consequences for the legal
process. One might ask if the differences in the particular concepts of
transfer of interest are expressions of differences in legal cultures.
“Cultural differences do explain something of why institutional and
procedural differences arise in different legal systems and why
transplanting legal institutes from one society to another may be more
difficult in one case than in another.”114 Of course, the U.S. and Germany
share common cultures in many aspects, because they are democracies
with free, strong economies. However, there are differences in the
historical experiences, in the structure of political and legal institutions,
in critical social values,115 and in the view of the constitutional state.
As a result of history, the Americans have a high level of distrust against
authority, especially because the judges in the colonies were considered
to be tools of the monarch. The American democracy is based on values
of individualism and self-sufficiency, which has an impact on the law.
One fundamental consequence for the procedure is that there is a heavy
reliance on the private initiative of the parties and their lawyers to protect
and vindicate legal rights,116 while the American judge is not considered
to be powerful. The general rule in common law countries is that the civil
litigation is lawyer-dominated, while the judge is considered to play a
passive role and acts more like a neutral umpire than a manager.117 This
traditional role of the counsels and judges and the “laissez fair
proceeding” in the U.S. is a significant feature of American legal culture.
In contrast, the European civil justice systems seem to represent a high
degree of reliance on state institutions118 and the judge is considered to
play an active role in the European systems on the continent, especially

114. Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 13 Duke J. Comp. &
Int’l L. 61, 70 (2003).
115. Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 7
(1997) (regarding the differences between the United States and Germany).
116. Murray & Stürner, German Civil Justice at 580 (2004).
117. Richard Freer, Civil Procedure at 5 f, (2nd ed. 2009).
118. Murray & Stürner, German Civil Justice at 580 (2004).
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in taking evidence. This procedure is labeled as “inquisitorial” or “non
adversarial.”119
It is an interesting fact that the particular problem of a transfer of interest
pendente lite is not treated typically “adversarial” and “inquisitorial” in
each system. Under F.R.C.P. 25 (c), the judge has more power than in
the civil law country Germany, because he is the one who decides
whether to allow the substitution. That means that the applicable rule for
the transfer of interest of the “adversarial system” is not adversarial, and
the relevant rules of the so-called “inquisitorial” civil procedure are not
“inquisitorial” at all.
Another mode demonstrating that the so-called adversarial system bears
features of the inquisitorial system is F.R.C.P 54 (c). Under this
provision, the judge has the power to grant more than the plaintiff asked
for. It is the court’s duty to grant all appropriate relief. Aside from
default judgment, the court can award relief beyond what is sought in the
complaint.120 That would not be permissive in Germany and Italy where,
according to § 308 ZPO121 and article 112 ICCP, the judge is bound to
what is demanded. The court cannot grant to the parties a relief different
from the one sought. In other words, in Italian and German litigation

119. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michele Taruffo, American Civil Procedure: An Introduction 86
(1997): This contrast is based on the difference in the judge`s role in taking evidence, especially in
the taking of witness testimony. But labeling the systems in the explained way – adversarial and
inquisitorial – is criticized a lot by some authors, who hold the view that in both – in the U.S. and on
the European Continent – the civil courts must work with what they are given and must establish the
facts for their judgment from the materials which the parties supply and cannot go beyond the parties
factual contentions.” Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 13 Duke J.
Comp. & Int’l L. 61, 66-7 (2003). Kötz states that the contrasting between the adversarial system
and the inquisitorial system “is not only misleading, but also downright wrong.” Also in the
Continental civil procedure the judge has no power to introduce independent evidence; he has to
base his judgment on the facts that the parties provide (“Da mihi facta, dabo tibi ius”). This principle
is called the “formal truth” (“formelle Wahrheit”) in contrast to the “material truth” (“materielle
Wahrheit”), which means the “real truth” and applies in criminal matters. “Formal truth is what the
court, to the best of its ability, believes to be true having regard to the evidence placed before it by
the parties.” Id. All in all, the critics say that the contrast between the American and the Continental
procedure “has been grossly overdrawn.” John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 824 (1985). Furthermore, both systems are considered to be
adversarial. Id.; Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 13 Duke J. Comp.
& Int’l L. at 61, 67; John von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the
Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, Europäisches Rechtsdenken in Geschichte und
Gegenwart: Festschrift für Helmut Coing 361 n. 3 (N. Horn ed. 1982). (Ger.).
120. Simona Grossi, A Comparative Analysis Between Italian Civil Proceedings and American
Civil Proceedings Before Federal Courts, 20 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 213 (2010).
121. Section 308 ZPO: “ (1) The court shall not be empowered to award by judgment a party
anything that shall have not been demanded. Without limiting the generality thereof, the forgoing
shall be applicable to trusts, interests and other supplementary claims. (2) The court must decide on
the obligations to bear he costs of the action also without a motion.“ Kinsella & Cormeaux, Digest of
Commercial Laws of the World, Binder 7.
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there has to be a strict correspondence between what the parties have
demanded and what is finally granted by the judge.122
One might say, the different approaches to the situation of the transfer of
interest pendente lite – on the one hand discretion of the court and on the
other hand consent of the parties – can also be considered an expression
of different legal cultures and different ideas of the constitutional state.
Discretion means flexibility and adaptability, which is the main feature
of common law and especially of the F.R.C.P. As already mentioned, the
F.R.C.P. are not designed to solve every single procedural problem in
detail; they are only a framework that provides a way to solve a problem.
Considering this, F.R.C.P. 25 (c) matches up to the concept of the
common law, which can be shaped and changed easily to reflect differing
circumstances and needs, while it can also reflect changing social
conditions.123 Discretion of the court is the “entrance” for different
considerations, whereas the consent of the parties means very clear
criteria that do not give any room for further considerations. Specific
rules are the feature of civil law countries, which are required due to their
specific view of the Constitutional State.
VI. CONCLUSION – MAIN DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES
OF THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN CONCEPTS
It can be concluded that the transfer of interest in the context of litigation
is treated similarly under the German procedural law and under the
American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The obvious similarity is
that the transfer of an asset is allowed once a trial is pending. This makes
sense in modern economic systems. Under the German and the American
concepts, the same proceeding is continued among the original parties
after the transfer occurs. The rationale of both rules is the same. Firstly, it
is efficient to continue the same trial. Secondly, nobody should be
deprived of his successes that have been reached during the proceeding,
so far. The loss of successes during the litigation would contradict the
principle of stability in the allocation of rights.124 Continuance is the only
way to avoid friction during the proceeding and to avoid unfairness.125

122. Concerning Italy: Simona Grossi, A Comparative Analysis Between Italian Civil
Proceedings and American Civil Proceedings Before Federal Courts, 20 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.
213 (2010).
123. Jonathan Humbach, Whose Monet?: An Introduction to the American Legal System 101
(2007).
124. Rainer Krause, Urteilswirkungen gegenüber Dritten im US-amerikanischen
Zivilprozesrecht at 73 (1994). (Ger.).
125. Id.
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Another main similarity is the possibility of the substitution of the
transferor. The requirements of such a substitution are different. While
the German law requires the consent of the transferor, the transferee, and
the opponent, the decision about the substitution under American law lies
in the discretion of the court. The German requirement of consent can be
assessed very clearly. The American model of discretion is a question of
convenience, and different considerations of efficiency and fairness
come in to play. Thus, the American rule leads to less predictability and
less clarity than the German concept.
Another similarity between the American and the German proceedings is
that a judgment is usually only binding between the parties. That is a
matter of concern, of course, because only the parties had the opportunity
to litigate. However, under the American and German law, the successor
is also bound in the situation of a transfer after pendency. That binding
effect upon the transferee is a necessary consequence.
The exception to the binding effect is good faith. In the context of the
protection of good faith, one of the main differences between the German
and the American law should be emphasized. Under the German law, the
good faith of the successor would decide the question, if he were bound
to the judgment. In the U.S., the knowledge of the adversary should
control the extension of the binding effect. Comparing the two concepts,
the considerations in the situation of a bona-fide-transferee are more
complex in the U.S. Furthermore, the requirements of a limitation on the
binding effect to third persons are much stricter than under the German
rule. As opposed to the German concept, the good faith on the side of the
transferee is not sufficient. Besides the good faith of the transferee, the
opposing party needs knowledge of the transfer and of the good faith.
Thus, good faith is protected less than it is under German law.
Another obvious similarity of both concepts is that the judgment is
enforceable against a third person. This is a necessary consequence
similar to the binding effect of the judgment upon the successor.
All in all, the big picture of the transfer of interest of an asset after the
trial is pending is the same. The German and the American rules stand in
the light of fairness and efficiency. Differences like the requirements of
the substitution and the protection of good faith are the mirror of
different legal cultures.
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